The State of Utah v. Phillip P. Larocco : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1987
The State of Utah v. Phillip P. Larocco : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Lisa J. Remal, Joan C. Watt; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorneys for Appellant.
David L. Wilkinson; Attorney General; Attorney for Respondent.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, The State of Utah v. Phillip P. Larocco, No. 870412.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1757
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE $TATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
PHILLIP P. LAROCCO, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 870412 
category No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a conviction and judgment for Theft of a 
Motor Vehicle, a second degree felony, and possession of a Stolen 
Vehicle, a third degree felony, in the Thi^ rd District Court, in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable David B. Dee, 
Judge, presiding. 
LISA J 
JOAN C 
SALT LAKE 
430 
Salt 
Attor 
Eas 
Lak 
n|eys 
REMAL 
WATT 
LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC, 
t 500 South, Suite 300 
e City, Utah 84111 
for Appellant 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
FILED 
JUN2 71988 
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
PHILLIP P. LAROCCO, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 870412 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a conviction and judgment for Theft of a 
Motor Vehicle, a second degree felony, and Possession of a Stolen 
Vehicle, a third degree felony, in the Third District Court, in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable David B. Dee, 
Judge, presiding. 
LISA J. REMAL 
JOAN C. WATT 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
430 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENT^ 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES vii 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS viii 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT X 
STATEMENT OF CASE 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 6 
ARGUMENT 7 
POINT I. THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF MR. LAROCCO'S 
CAR VIOLATED HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE 
UTAH AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. . 7 
A. STANDING 7 
B. FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 10 
C. ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 19 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
MR. LAROCCO'S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL 
AFTER A JUROR AND A PROSECUTION 
WITNESS CONVERSED DURING A RECESS. . . . 23 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
MR. LAROCCO'S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL 
AFTER TWO JURORS APPARENTLY SAW 
HIM SHACKLED AND IN POLICE CUSTODY. . . 28 
POINT IV. POSSESSION OF A STOLEN VEHICLE 
IS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF 
THEFT OF THAT SAME VEHICLE 31 
A. MR. LAROCCO CANNOT BE 
CONVICTED OF BOTH THEFT OF A 
MOTOR VEHICLE AND POSSESSION 
OF THAT SAME VEHICLE 32 
ii. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS CONTINUED 
PAGE 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT 
POSSESSION OF A STOLEN VEHICLE 
IS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE 
OF THEFT OF THAT SAME VEHICLE. . . . 36 
CONCLUSION 39 
iii. 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
PAGE 
CASES CITED 
Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980). 37 
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 
85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985) 15, 16, 19 
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) 15 
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) 13, 14, 20 
Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980) 28, 29 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) 14, 17, 20 
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) 28, 29, 31 
Hudson v. Texas, 588 S.W. 348 (Tex. 1979) 15 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); 12 
Milanovich v. United States, 365 U.S. 551, 81 S.Ct. 728, 
5 L.Ed.2d 773 (1961) 34 
New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 106 S.Ct. 960, 
89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) 11, 12, 19 
Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 
43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975) 19 
People v. Duran, 127 Cal. Rptr. 618, 
545 P.2d 1322 (Cal. 1976) 29, 30 
People v. Jackson, 723 P.2d 741 (Colo. 1981) 34 
People v. jaramillo, 548 P.2d 706 (Cal. 1976) 34 
Pierce v. State, 627 P.2d 211 (Alaska App. 1981) 34 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 
58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978) 7 
Shackleford v. State, 481 P.2d 163 (Okl. 1971) 34 
Simpson v. United States, 346 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1965) . . . 8, 10 
State v. Alvarez, 678 P.2d 1132 (Kan. App. 1984) 34 
iv. 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CONTINUED 
PAGE 
CASES CONTINUED 
State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983) 36, 37 
State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874 (Utah 1985) 33 
State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1987) 33 
State v. Brown, 721 P.2d 1357 (Or. 1986) 21, 22 
State v. Brown, 694 P.2d 587 (Utah 1984) 37 
State v. Caraher, 653 P.2d 942 (1982) 21 
State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408 (Utah 1984) 20 
State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119 (Utah 1983) 20 
State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125 (Utah 1987) 9 
State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 620 (Utah 1987) 17 
State v. Erickson, 749 P.2d 620 (Utah 1987) 24, 25, 26 
State v. Griffin, 626 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981) 7 
State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175 (Utah 1983) 13 
State v. Hernandez, 689 P.2d 1261 (Mont. 1984) . . 33 
State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983) 32, 33, 35 
State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) 19 
State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452 (Utah 1987) 10, 19 
State v. Kock, 725 P.2d 1285 (Or. 1985) 21 
State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Utah App. 1987) 1 
State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978) . 20 
State v. Mcpherson, 444 P.2d 5 (Or. 1968) 34 
State v. Montayne, 414 P.2d 958 (Utah 1966) 8, 9 
State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985) . . . 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 31 
v. 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CONTINUED 
PAGE 
CASES CONTINUED 
State v. Purcell, 586 P.2d 441 (Utah 1978) 9 
State v. Richards/ 621 P.2d 165 (Wash. App. 1980) 34 
State v. Smith, 679 P.2d 963 (N.M. App. 1983) 34 
State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334 (Utah 1984) 9 
State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988) 10 
Sundberg v. State, 636 P.2d 619 (Alaska App. 1981) 34 
United States v. Jamerson, 549 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1977). . . 8 
United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) 17 
United States v. Johnson, 431 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1969). . . . 11 
United States v. Polk, 433 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1970) 11 
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) 18 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONS CITED 
Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution 10, 11, 12, 14 
Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution 23, 31 
Article I, §10, Utah Constitution 23 
Article I, §14, Utah Constitution 19 
Utah Code Ann. §41-1-112 (1953 as amended) 1, 35 
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402(3) (1953 as amended) 31, 32, 36 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as amended) 1, 34 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412 (1953 as amended) 1, 35 
vi. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Were Mr. Larocco's rights against unreasonable search 
and seizure violated where, without obtaining a warrant, the 
officers opened the door of the vehicle in search of a vehicle 
identification number (VIN) after viewing a VIN on the dashboard 
which did not match that of the stolen vehicle? 
2. Did the trial court err in denying Mr. Larocco's 
motion for a mistrial after a juror and a prosecution witness 
conversed during a recess in the trial? 
3. Did the trial court err in denying Mr. Larocco's 
motion for mistrial after two jurors apparently saw him shackled and 
in police custody? 
4. Is possession of a stolen vehicle a lesser included 
offense of theft of that same vehicle? 
vii. 
TEXT OF STATUES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to 
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of counsel for his defense. 
Article I, Section 14, of the Utah Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
Article I, Section 10, of the Utah Constitution provides: 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate. In courts of general jurisdictions, except in capital 
cases, jury shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of inferior 
jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In criminal cases 
the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the 
jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived 
unless demanded. 
viii. 
TEXT CONTINUED 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as amended) provides: 
76-6-404. Theft—Elements.—A person commits theft if he 
obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property of 
another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402(3)(a) (1953 as amended) provides: 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included 
in the offense charged but may not be convicted of both the offense 
charged and the included offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than 
all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense 
charged. 
Utah Code Ann. 41-1-112 (1953 as amended) provides: 
Receiving or transferring stolen vehicle a felony. Any 
person who, with intent to procure or pass title to a vehicle which 
he knows or has reason to believe has been stolen or unlawfully 
taken, receives, or transfers possession of the same from or to 
another, or who has in his possession any vehicle which he knows or 
has reason to believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken, and who 
is not an officer of the law engaged at the time in the performance 
of his duty as such officer, is guilty of a felony. 
ix. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §77-35-26 (1953 as amended) whereby a defendant may take 
an appeal from a final judgment of conviction, and pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2-2(5) (1953 as amended) whereby the Court has 
discretion to grant a petition for writ of certiorari to review a 
decision of the Court of Appeals. On January 26, 1988, this Court 
entered its order granting Mr. Larocco's Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in all 
issues raised herein. See Addendum A. 
x. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
PHILLIP P. LAROCCO, : Case No. 870412 
Defendant/Appellant. : Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Appellant, Phillip Paul Larocco, appeals from a 
conviction and judgment for Theft of a Motor Vehicle, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 and 
§76-6-412 (1953 as amended) and Possession of a Stolen Vehicle, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-1-112 (1953 
as amended). A jury convicted Mr. Larocco of both charges after a 
trial held on December 9 and 10, 1985. On January 10, 1985, 
Honorable David Dee, Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, sentenced Mr. Larocpo to concurrent terms of 
one to fifteen years and zero to five years at the Utah State Prison. 
Mr. Larocco timely appealed his conviction to the Utah 
Court of Appeals, raising four issues on appeal. On August 27, 
1987, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its opinion, affirming the 
convictions. That decision is published at State v. Larocco, 742 
P.2d 89 (Utah App. 1987). The Utah Court of Appeals denied 
Mr. Larocco's Petition for Rehearing on October 6, 1987. On 
January 26, 1988, this Court granted Mr. Larocco's Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals on all issues raised 
below. See Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In June, 1981, a man took a 1973 Ford Mustang for a test 
drive from State Auto Sales Car Lot. The man did not return the 
car, nor did he pay for it (R. 186). The salesman, David Luce, 
promptly reported the theft and gave a description of the thief to 
police (R. 202). Mr. Luce described the thief as a white male, 5'8n 
to 5'10* tall and weighing approximately 160-165 pounds; he also 
told police that the thief resembled Dom DeLuise (R. 202). The 
police did not arrest anyone on the charge at that time. 
Four years later, in May, 1985, Mr. Luce saw a person he 
believed to be the thief at a different car lot (R. 190). Mr. Luce 
obtained information regarding the man he believed to be the thief 
and relayed it to Mr. Padilla, the owner of State Auto Sales (R. 
192) . 
Mr. Padilla went to the neighborhood where the person Mr. 
Luce had seen lived (R. 215). Mr. Padilla could not locate the 
exact street address, but spotted a 1973 Ford Mustang within a 
couple blocks of the address (R. 214-5). The Mustang was in front 
of Mr. Larocco's home (R. 231, 237-8). Mr. Padilla did not see or 
speak to Mr. Larocco or anyone else while viewing the Mustang. Mr. 
Padilla took down the license number, and contacted police (R. 215). 
Two or three days later, Salt Lake County Detective Linda 
Robison went to Mr. Larocco's house and saw a 1973 Ford Mustang 
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parked in front, in the same place Mr. Padilla had reported seeing 
it a few days earlier (R. 231). She noted the license number of the 
car, its description, and the address, and then left without 
further approaching the vehicle or residence (R. 231-33). 
Detective Robison ran a check on the plate and received a 
vehicle identification number ("VIN") of 3F05H101968. A VIN search 
revealed that a Mr. Neil Hailes of Salt Lake City had purchased the 
car in 1973 and registered it through 1975; the next registration 
entry for the VIN was to Mr. Larocco (R. 232-3). 
About a week later, Detective Robison, Salt Lake County 
Detective Owen and Kip Ingersoll from the Department of Motor 
Vehicles went back to Mr. Larocco's home and observed the 1973 Ford 
Mustang still parked there (R. 234). The trio looked through the 
windshield and saw a VIN on the dash which was identical to the one 
obtained by the detective when she ran a license check 
(3F05H101968) . Mr. Ingersoll, the employee of the Department of 
Motor Vehicles, inspected the visible VIN on the dashboard from the 
exterior of the vehicle and determined that it appeared to be 
affixed in the normal manner (R. 283). The visible VIN did not 
match the VIN of the vehicle taken from Mr. Padilla's lot four years 
earlier (R. 235-6). 
After seeing the matching VIN on the dashboard, the 
police opened the driver's door; the police did not have a warrant 
when they entered the car in this manner (See Stipulation of Facts 
in connection with Defendant's Motion to Suppress, on August 6, 
1985). After opening the car door, the police found a 
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different VIN, 3F05164088 on the safety standard sticker located on 
the inside edge of the door (R. 235). The VIN on the safety 
standard sticker matched that of the Mustang stolen from State Auto 
Sales Car Lot four years earlier (R. 235). After finding the second 
VIN, the police approached Mr. Laroccofs home and arrested him 
(R. 15). 
When the officers contacted Mr. Larocco on June 6, 1985, 
he informed them that he had purchased the car from Streator 
Chevrolet in 1981 (R. 239). Mr. Larocco's brother-in-law gave 
police a Utah Certificate of Title showing a Ford Mustang with VIN 
3F05H101968 belonging to Mr. Larocco (R. 240-1). 
After impounding the vehicle, Mr. Ingersoll of the 
Department of Motor Vehicles located on the car's frame a shorter 
version of VIN similar to the VIN on the stolen Padilla vehicle 
(R. 269-72). Although the VIN on the dash appeared normal when 
Mr. Ingersoll inspected it from the exterior, he also discovered 
that the VIN on the dashboard had been glued on rather than riveted 
(R. 270-1). Subsequent investigation revealed that the VIN on the 
dashboard matched a vehicle owned by Mr. Hailes which had been 
totally destroyed in an accident in December, 1975 (R. 233, 251). 
Prior to trial, Mr. Larocco filed a timely motion to 
suppress evidence obtained by police as a result of the warrantless 
search of Mr. Larocco's vehicle on June 6, 1985; the trial court 
denied that motion (R. 60). Immediately before the trial started, 
defense counsel renewed the motion to suppress and made a continuing 
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objection to the use of the evidence seized (R. 169). At one of the 
recesses immediately prior to the start of trial but after the 
jurors had been sworn, one of the jurors had a fairly lengthly 
conversation with witness Hailes, the man who had owned a 1973 
Mustang with VIN matching that found on the dashboard of 
Mr. Larocco's car (R. 164). The conversation dealt with general 
topics as well as topics specific to the trial process (R. 164-7). 
Another juror standing nearby apparently overheard the 
conversation (R. 167). The trial court questioned the juror who had 
been involved in the conversation, but did not question the juror 
who apparently overheard the conversation to determine the impact of 
the conversation (R. 167). Mr. Larocco moved for a mistrial based 
on the conversation; the court denied the motion (R. 168-9). 
Mr. Larocco requested that the trial court instruct the 
jury that Possession of a Stolen Vehicle is a lesser included 
offense of Theft of a Motor Vehicle (R. 324; See Addendum D). The 
trial court denied the request and instructed the jury that it could 
convict on both charges despite defense counsel's objection 
(R. 324). The jury convicted Mr. Larocco of both counts (R. 325). 
After the jury returned its verdict, the trial court 
learned that two jurors had seen activity indicating that 
Mr. Larocco was in custody during the trial. Juror Bragg saw 
Mr. Larocco, apparently handcuffed, being escorted down the stairs 
by a man wearing a suit (R. 328). Juror Broadhead saw Mr. Larocco 
being placed in a police car (R. 328-9). Both jurors told the trial 
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court that these observations had no influence on their 
deliberations in the case (R. 329). 
On January 10, 1986, Mr. Larocco made a timely motion to 
arrest judgment based on the conversation between a juror and a 
prosecution witness and also upon the observations of jurors which 
led them to believe Mr. Larocco was in custody (R. 104-5). The 
trial court denied the motion (R. 345). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The warrantless search of Mr. Larocco's vehicle violated 
his rights against unreasonable search and seizure under the United 
States Constitution. Mr. Larocco had standing to raise the issue 
and the officers actions constituted an impermissible search. 
The warrantless search also violated Mr. Larocco's rights 
under the Utah Constitution. In the event this Court determines 
that the warrantless search did not violate Mr. Larocco's federal 
rights, it is nevertheless free to guarantee greater protections 
under the Utah Constitution and continue to require that the 
officers have both exigent circumstances and probable cause to 
justify the warrantless search of a vehicle. 
The trial court erred in denying Mr. Larocco's motion for 
mistrial after a juror and prosecution witness conversed during a 
recess. The contact was more than brief or incidental and the state 
failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice raised by such contact. 
The trial court erred in denying Mr. Larocco's motion for 
mistrial after two jurors apparently saw him shackled and in police 
custody. Mr. Larocco's rights to a fair trial and equal protection 
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of the laws were jeopardized when the jury received information that 
he was incarcerated and in police custody at the time of trial. 
The trial court erred in instructing the jury that Mr. 
Larocco could be convicted of both possession of a stolen vehicle, 
and theft of that same vehicle. The possession charge is 
encompassed by the theft and therefore it was error to enter 
judgment against Mr. Larocco under both statutes. Furthermore, 
Mr. Larocco was entitled to an instruction that possession of a 
stolen vehicle was a lesser included offense of theft. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF MR. LAROCCOfS CAR 
VIOLATED HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE UTAH AND 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
A. STANDING 
A criminal defendant who does not assert a possessory or 
property interest in a car, or automobile which is searched or in 
evidence seized cannot raise a claim that his rights under the 
fourth amendment to the federal constitution were violated. See 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 
(1978). This Court has held similarly that the protection from 
unreasonable searches and seizures contained in Article I, §14 of 
the Utah Constitution is personal in nature and can be asserted only 
by one who has a right in the car, house or evidence seized. State 
v. Griffin, 626 P.2d 478, 480 (Utah 1981). 
In Rakas, the petitioners were passengers in a vehicle 
which was searched by officers without a warrant. The United States 
Supreme Court established the inquiry for whether an individual has 
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standing to raise a fourth amendment issue as "whether the person 
who claims protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation 
of privacy in the invaded space," Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143. 
In Simpson v. United States, 346 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 
1965), the government charged the defendant with auto theft, and 
claimed that he lacked standing to contest the search of the vehicle 
after it was seized from him. The Simpson court focused on the 
weakness of such an argument: 
[0]f all defendants prosecuted for automobile theft, 
only those who actually owned the automobiles could 
raise Fourth Amendment objections successfully. 
Moreover, the proof of ownership would be sufficient 
to quash the prosecution for theft of the 
automobile. These constitutional rights belong to 
the guilty as well as the innocent. (citation 
omitted). The sole prerequisite to a defendant's 
raising the Fourth Amendment issue is that he claims 
a proprietary or possessory interest in the searched 
or seized property. 
Id. at 294. 
Other jurisdictions have adopted the Simpson approach. 
See e.g. United States v. Jamerson, 549 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1977). 
This Court has reviewed the issue of standing to 
challenge the search of an allegedly stolen vehicle in a number of 
cases. 
In State v. Montayne, 414 P.2d 958 (Utah 1966), defendant 
rented a car from a car rental agency under a false name and failed 
to return it when due. The defendant did not allege ownership in 
the car and, because the officers established prior to the search 
that the defendant did not own the car, the Court held that the 
defendant did not have standing to raise the search issue. 
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In State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334 (Utah 1984) and State 
v. Purcell, 586 P.2d 441 (Utah 1978), this Court held that a 
defendant does not have standing to question the search of an 
automobile where the defendant concedes that he does not own the 
vehicle and cannot demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy 
in the automobile. Montayne, Purcell, and Valdez are 
distinguishable from the present case since Mr. Larocco claimed an 
ownership interest in the vehicle and it whs not established prior 
to the search that he did not have such an interest. 
In State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125 (Utah 1987), the 
officer stopped a car driven by the defendant because he knew the 
defendant had a suspended drivers license. The car was registered 
to another person and defendant presented no evidence suggesting 
that he had permission to drive the vehicle. This Court found that 
the defendant had no standing to challenge the legality of the 
search, pointing out that "[a]bsent claimed right to possession, he 
could not assert any expectation of privacy in the items 
seized. . . ." Id. at 127. 
In all of the Utah cases where this Court found that the 
defendant did not have standing to raise the search issue, officers 
established prior to the search that the defendant did not own or 
have a possessory interest in the property searched. In contrast, 
in the instant case, the police knew that the car was registered to 
Mr. Larocco and parked in front of his house. 
Requiring a defendant to establish his ownership of the 
vehicle in order to have standing to challenge the automobile search 
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would require a defendant charged with auto theft to prove the 
ultimate issue in the case. However, where a defendant had such 
proof, there would be no need to challenge the search because the 
theft charges would be quashed. 
In the instant case, where Mr. Larocco claimed an 
ownership interest in the vehicle and the information available to 
officers prior to the search confirmed that ownership interest, 
Mr. Larocco had standing to challenge the legality of the search 
under either the Utah or United States Constitution.1 He should not 
be required to prove the ultimate issue of the case in order to 
assert his claim. 
B. FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 
The fourth amendment to the federal constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
In Simpson v. United States, 346 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1965), the 
Court held that entrance into a car to find the VIN was a search 
under the fourth amendment and the warrantless search of the vehicle 
was unlawful. In Simpson, officers seized the car parked outside 
the defendant's hotel room after arresting the defendant for 
1
 In the event this Court determines that Mr. Larocco does not have 
standing to raise a fourth amendment claim, it is nevertheless free 
to decide that Mr. Larocco has standing to raise such a claim under 
the Utah Constitution. See State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 
(Utah 1988) n.8; State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452 (Utah 1987) 
(Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
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vagrancy. The Tenth Circuit suppressed the VIN as the fruit of an 
unlawful search. 
In United States v. Polk, 433 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1970), 
the Court reached the opposite conclusion, finding that entry into a 
vehicle to ascertain the VIN does not constitute a search. The 
decision in Polk has drawn criticism from commentators and courts. 
Professor LaFave stated: 
Although this reasoning is not without some force, 
the conclusion in Polk that entry of a vehicle to 
find the VIN is no search and thus is not "within 
the scope of the Fourth Amendment" is unsound. That 
form of police surveillance, it is submitted, should 
not go totally unregulated by constitutional 
restraints, for that would mean that police could 
enter any particular car on a whim and that they 
could make wholesale entries of cars on nothing more 
than a hope that one of them might turn out to be 
stolen. Such surveillance intrudes upon a justified 
expectation of privacy and thus, as Katz v. United 
States teaches, is subject to Fourth Amendment 
limitations. 
LaFave, I Search and Seizure at 359-60. See also United States v. 
Johnson, 431 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1969) (Godbold J. dissenting). 
In New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 
L.Ed.2d 81 (1986), the United States Supreme Court held that the 
fourth amendment was not violated where an officer reached inside a 
vehicle to move papers that were obscuring the VIN on the dashboard 
after the driver had been stopped for a traffic violation, and had 
exited the vehicle. In the course of moving the papers on the 
dashboard, the officer observed a gun protruding from underneath the 
driver's seat. The Court reasoned that since VINs are heavily 
regulated and the VIN of cars built after 1969 must be on the 
dashboard and readable from outside the vehicle, an individual does 
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not have an expectation of privacy in such a VIN and the officer 
could move the papers to view that VIN. The Court clearly stated, 
however, that its holding 
does not authorize police officers to enter a 
vehicle to obtain a dashboard mounted VIN when the 
VIN is visible from outside the automobile. If the 
VIN is in the plain view of someone outside the 
vehicle, there is no justification for governmental 
intrusion into the passenger compartment to see it. 
Id. at 94. 
The Court further noted that the respondent sought to suppress the 
gun, not the VIN, and the interior of a vehicle is subject to fourth 
amendment protection and "the intrusion into that space constituted 
a 'search1" Id. at 115. 
The present case is distinguishable from Class in that 
Mr. Larocco was not stopped on a traffic violation nor was he in the 
vehicle when the officers approached it. Furthermore, the VIN was 
mounted on the dashboard and clearly visible from outside the 
vehicle as required by law and did not appear to have been tampered 
with. Under such circumstances, there was no basis for opening the 
door of the vehicle or looking inside, and such an entry constituted 
a search under the fourth amendment. 
While the general rule is that police may not conduct a 
search unless they obtain a warrant based on probable cause from a 
neutral magistrate, the United States Supreme Court has carved a few 
limited, specifically delineated exceptions to that rule. See Katz 
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 
106, 116-17, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986). 
- 12 -
In State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175 (Utah 1983), this Court 
outlined the exceptions to the warrant requirement. Those 
exceptions are: (1) consent searches, (2) searches and seizures 
made in hot pursuit, (3) searches and seizes of contraband in public 
areas, (4) seizure of evidence in plain view after a lawful 
intrusion, (5) searches and seizures of incident to lawful arrest 
under exigent circumstances and (6), searches and seizures of 
automobiles under exigent circumstances. Id. at 179. 
In the instant case, the only exception which is arguably 
applicable is the "automobile exception". The automobile exception 
was first enunciated in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 
(1925). In Carroll, police officers stopped a car and subsequently 
searched it based on probable cause to believe liquor was inside the 
vehicle. After the officers found and seized liquor from the 
vehicle, the Appellant challenged the warrantless search. 
The United States Supreme Court upheld the search, 
reasoning that some warrantless searches of automobiles are 
permissible even though such a search of a building would not be 
since automobiles can be easily moved, thereby causing the evidence 
to be lost. The Carroll Court allowed a limited exception to the 
warrant requirement where officers had probable cause and the 
exigencies of the situation made it impossible or highly impractical 
to obtain a warrant. Where officers stop k moving vehicle, the 
occupants are put on notice that officers have knowledge of their 
wrongdoing, and, because of the mobility of the vehicle, there is a 
high probability that the evidence would be lost or destroyed if 
- 13 -
officers were to get a warrant before searching it. Hence, for a 
search to be permissible under the "automobile exception" both 
exigent circumstances and probable cause must be present. 
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the 
United States Supreme Court found the "automobile exception" 
inapplicable and suppressed the evidence obtained from the 
warrantless search. In Coolidge, police suspected that the 
defendant may have been involved in a murder. After performing an 
investigation, officers arrested the defendant in his house and 
seized his automobile, which was parked in his driveway. The Court 
held that because officers knew of the presence of the automobile 
and planned to seize it, no exigent circumstances existed to justify 
police failure to obtain a valid warrant. The Court pointed out 
that "the determining factors [were] advance police knowledge of the 
existence and location of the evidence, police intention to seize 
it, and the ample opportunity for obtaining a warrant. Coolidge, 
403 U.S. at 478, 482. 
The Coolidge Court reaffirmed the two prong test for the 
"automobile exception" set forth in Carroll—that officers must have 
probable cause and exigent circumstances must exist to justify a 
warrantless search under the "automobile exception." Id. at 
461-62. The Court emphasized that without such requirements, ". . . 
it is but a short step to the position that it is never necessary 
for the police to obtain a warrant before searching and seizing an 
automobile" and "we would simply have to read the Fourth Amendment 
out of the Constitution". Id. at 479-80. Therefore, automobiles 
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are protected from warrantless search and seizure, unless officers 
have probable cause and exigencies require the immediate search and 
seizure. 
In Hudson v. Texas, 588 S.W. 348 (Tex. 1979), the Court 
held that the exigency required for a valid warrantless search of an 
automobile is either (1) the car was moving when stopped, or (2) if 
parked and unoccupied, the car was movable, the owner was alerted 
that officers were investigating and the car would have been moved 
if police did not immediately seize it. The Court distinguished 
between "moving" and "movable" vehicles and pointed out that while 
in some circumstances, the same exigency may exist with an 
unoccupied vehicle as with a moving one, that is not always the 
case. Hudson clarifies the exigencies announced by the United 
States Supreme Court in Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974), 
under which a parked movable car can be seized and searched without 
a warrant. 
In California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 
85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985), the United States Supreme Court applied the 
"automobile exception" to the warrantless search of a motor home 
parked in a parking lot. In Carney, officers who had uncorroborated 
information that an individual was dispensing drugs in exchange for 
sex from his motor home, questioned a young man who was leaving the 
motor home. The youth informed the officers that he had received 
marijuana in return for sexual favors inside the motor home. At the 
officers' request, the youth knocked on the door of the motor home. 
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In response, Carney stepped outside and officers arrested him. 
Thereafter, officers searched the inside of the motor home without a 
warrant. 
In Carney, the Court stated: 
When a vehicle is being used on the highways, or if 
it is readily capable of such use and is found 
stationary in a place not regularly used for 
residential purposes—temporary or otherwise—the 
two justifications for the vehicle exception come 
into play. First the vehicle is obviously readily 
mobile by the turn of an ignition key, if not 
actually moving. Second, there is a reduced 
expectation of a privacy stemming from its use as a 
licensed motor vehicle subject to a range of police 
regulation inapplicable to a fixed dwelling. 
Id. at 392-3 (footnote omitted). Exigent circumstances existed in 
Carney since the vehicle was parked in a public parking lot and 
could be easily moved. 
In the instant case, exigencies justifying a warrantless 
search did not exist. The automobile was parked in front of 
Mr. Larocco's home and had been parked in that same location for 
several days. There is no evidence that Mr. Larocco knew the 
officers were investigating him, nor was there any other evidence 
that suggested that the officers needed to immediately search the 
vehicle. The leisurely pace of the investigation and the repeated 
visits to the vehicle demonstrate that the officers would have had 
ample opportunity to obtain a search warrant.2 The present 
2 To obtain a search warrant, the officers would have had to 
establish to a neutral magistrate that they had probable cause. 
However, as discussed infra, probable cause did not exist in this 
case. 
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case is similar to Coolidge in that police had conducted an 
investigation prior to the search and seizure of the automobile and 
seized the vehicle when it was parked and unoccupied. 
When a warrantless search or seizure is challenged, it is 
the statefs burden to demonstrate the exigent circumstances 
justifying it. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951). As 
was the case in Coolidge, no exigent circumstances justifying a 
warrantless arrest existed in this case and the "automobile 
exception" is therefore inapplicable. 
Furthermore, officers lacked probable cause to search and 
seize the automobile. in addition to exigent circumstances, 
officers must have probable cause to search in order to permissibly 
search a vehicle without a warrant under the automobile exception. 
See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
In State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986), this 
Court quoted Brinegar v. United States, 33$ U.S. 160, 175-6, 69 
S.Ct. 1302, 1310-11, 93 L.Ed. 7879 (1949): 
Probable cause exists where "the facts and 
circumstances within their [the officers'] knowledge 
and of which they had reasonably trustworthy 
information [are] sufficient in themselves to 
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief 
that" an offense has been or is being committed. 
This Court further stated: 
The determination of whether probable cause exists, 
therefore, depends upon an examination of all the 
information available to the searching officer in 
light of the circumstances as they existed at the 
time the search was made (citations omitted). 
State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d at 1088. 
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In the present case, police did not have probable cause 
to justify the search of the Appellant's car. After finding the car 
parked in front of the Mr. Larocco's home, the police approached the 
vehicle and looked through the windshield to see the VIN on the 
dashboard. This action was legal because it did not require 
entrance into the automobile, as the dash mounted VIN can be seen 
from the street. The VIN on the dash was registered to Mr. Larocco 
and did not match the VIN of the vehicle stolen from the car lot. 
Furthermore, the VIN on the dash appeared to be correctly mounted 
and did not seem to be tampered with (R. 283). 
At that point police should have either continued their 
investigation or attempted to obtain Mr. Larocco's consent to enter 
the car. The fact that the car's VIN did not match that of the 
stolen car left the police officers without probable cause to search 
the car. The police actions in entering the car at that point were 
based on no more than a hunch. The United States Supreme Court has 
held on a number of occasions that hunches will not suffice where 
probable cause is lacking. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 
85 (1979). 
In the present case, where the officers' entry into the 
interior of the vehicle constituted a search, and there were no 
exigent circumstances or probable cause to justify such a 
warrantless search, the search violated the fourth amendment and the 
evidence seized should have been suppressed. Mr. Larocco 
respectfully requests that his conviction be reversed, and the 
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matter remanded to the district court for a new trial without the 
illegally seized evidence. 
C. ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution contains 
language almost identical to that of the fourth amendment to the 
federal constitution. In the event this Court determines that New 
York v. Class or California v. Carney preclude fourth amendment 
protection in the present case, this Court nevertheless has the 
ability to interpret Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
differently from the Fourth Amendment and extend the protections of 
that section to the facts of this case. See State v. Watts, 750 
P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1988) n.8; State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452 
(Utah 1987)(Zimmerman, J., concurring), State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 
271-2 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring). It is well 
established that in interpreting their own constitutions, states are 
not limited by the interpretation given comparable federal 
constitutional provisions. See Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 95 
S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975). 
As previously outlined in point (b), supra, at 13-16, the 
United States Supreme Court initially allowed an automobile 
exception to the warrant requirement only where exigent 
circumstances justified the suspension of the warrant requirement 
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and officers had probable cause to believe the automobile contained 
contraband or evidence relating to a crime. In Carroll v. United 
States, 278 U.S. 132 (1925), the Court held that a warrantless 
search of an automobile does not violate the fourth amendment where 
the officers have probable cause to search and the occupants are 
alerted, the car can be moved and the contents of the vehicle may be 
destroyed if the officers wait to search it until they have obtained 
a warrant. 
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, exigent circumstances 
justifying the suspension of the warrant requirement did not exist 
and the Court refused to uphold the search, thereby reaffirming the 
need for both exigent circumstances and probable cause in order to 
dispense with the warrant requirement when searching an automobile. 
Hence, historically, the automobile exception to the fourth 
amendment warrant requirement has not been applicable unless the 
officers had probable cause and exigent circumstances justify the 
warrantless entry. 
Utah case law has coincided with the historical 
requirement under the fourth amendment that both exigent 
circumstances and probable cause are required to search an 
automobile without a warrant. See State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 
408 (Utah 1984); State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978); State 
v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119 (Utah 1983). Such cases have been decided 
under both the State and federal constitutions. 
The Oregon Supreme Court has taken the position that 
"[w]hen this court gives Oregon law an interpretation corresponding 
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to a federal opinion, our decision remains the Oregon law even when 
federal doctrine later changes" State v, Caraher, 653 P.2d 942 
(1982). Under this approach, cases heretofore decided under 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution which require exigent 
circumstances to justify the search of an automobile are still 
controlling, and regardless of any change in the federal law, are 
still applicable to the instant case. 
In State v. Brown, 721 P.2d 1357 (Or. 1986), the Oregon 
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the Oregon Constitution 
required officers to obtain a warrant to search the trunk of a 
vehicle they had lawfully stopped where the officers had probable 
cause to believe that the trunk contained evidence of a crime. The 
Court held that an automobile exception to the warrant requirement 
of the Oregon Constitution existed where (1) the automobile was 
mobile at the time it was stopped by officers and (2) the officers 
had probable cause to search the vehicle. Id. at 1360. The Court 
determined that the mobility of the automobile created an exigency, 
but left open the question of whether a warrant is required where an 
automobile is parked and unoccupied. Jjd. at 1362-3. 
In State v. Kock, 725 P.2d 1285 (Or. 1985), the Oregon 
Supreme Court addressed the question it had left open in Brown, and 
held that under the Oregon Constitution, "any search of an 
automobile that was parked, immobile and unoccupied at the time the 
police first encountered it . . . must be authorized by a warrant 
issued by a magistrate or, alternatively, the prosecution must 
demonstrate that exigent circumstances other than the potential 
mobility of the automobile exist." Id. at 1287. 
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The Court pointed out that it would not extend the automobile 
exception under the Oregon Constitution to the extent the United 
States Supreme Court had extended it under the fourth amendment and 
that "Brown sets the outer limit for warrantless automobile searches 
without other exigent circumstances." Id. 
Pursuant to Utah case law, regardless of the direction 
federal case law has taken, both probable cause and exigent 
circumstances are required for the "automobile exception" to justify 
a warrantless search of a vehicle. In the instant case, as outlined 
above, probable cause to search the vehicle did not exist since the 
officers saw a VIN which did not match that of the stolen vehicle 
from outside the Mustang. 
In addition, no exigent circumstances justifying a 
warrantless search existed. The Mustang had been parked in front of 
Mr. Larocco's house for several days, and a citizen witness as well 
as an officer had inspected its exterior on at least two separate 
occasions. The officers had not contacted Mr. Larocco nor was there 
any indication that Mr. Larocco was aware of the investigation. 
Under such circumstances, exigencies justifying the 
warrantless search did not exist, and officers violated Article I, 
§14 of the Utah Constitution in searching the car without first 
obtaining a warrant. As a result, the trial court erred in failing 
to suppress the VIN seized from the door jamb, and the conviction 
should be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial without the 
illegally seized evidence. 
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR MISTRIAL AFTER A JUROR AND A 
PROSECUTION WITNESS CONVERSED DURING A RECESS. 
After the jury had been sworn but before any evidence had 
been taken, a juror and a prosecution witness engaged in 
conversation, while sharing an ashtray (R. 164-9).3 Mr. Larocco 
made a timely motion for mistrial which the trial court denied 
(R. 168-9). 
Both the United States and the Utah Constitutions 
guarantee a criminal defendant a fair trial by an impartial jury. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, states: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district 
shall have been previously ascertained by law, and 
to be informed of the nature anc? cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
assistance of counsel for his defense. 
Similarly, Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of 
Utah provides for criminal trial by an impartial jury. 
In State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985), while citing 
both the Sixth Amendment and Article I, Section 10 of the Utah 
Constitution, this Court pointed out that n[t]he rule in this 
jurisdiction is that improper contact with witnesses or parties 
raised a rebuttable presumption of prejudice" (Id. at 280) and 
3 The entire record of the trial court's questioning of Ms. Lembke 
following this conversation is attached as Addendum B. 
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established that such a presumption attaches, regardless of the 
content of the conversation, where the contact goes beyond the 
barest, incidental contact. This Court pointed out that a juror 
might not recognize the impact of any contact with witnesses or 
parties to the action, and that a defendant might be left with 
questions as to the juror's impartiality after any such contact. 
Id. As a result, this Court placed the burden "on the prosecution 
to prove that unauthorized contact did not influence the juror." Id. 
In Pike, the arresting officer who also witnessed a 
portion of the incident conversed with jurors regarding an accident 
he had at home which caused him to limp. This Court found that the 
conversation was more than a brief incidental contact and had the 
effect "of breeding a sense of familiarity that could clearly affect 
the juror's judgment as to credibility." Id. Although the jurors 
denied that the contact would influence their deliberations, this 
Court found that the denial was not sufficient to rebut the 
presumption of prejudice, and remanded the case for a new trial. 
This Court reached a similar decision in State v. 
Erickson, 749 P.2d 620 (Utah 1987). In Erickson, one of the 
prosecution witnesses engaged in a four to five minute conversation 
with a juror. The juror had previously disclosed during voir dire 
that he and the witness had been neighbors approximately thirty 
years before. The juror and witness thereafter discussed their 
families and jobs, but did not discuss the case. This Court 
reversed the case and remanded it for a new trial, pointing out that 
in Pike it held that "the denial by a juror that he had not been 
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influenced by the encounter was not enough to overcome the 
presumption of prejudice." Id. at 16. 
In the instant case, the contact between Juror Lembke and 
the prosecution witness was more egregious than the contact in 
either Pike or Erickson, and was not brief or incidental. After the 
jury had been selected, and immediately prior to the start of the 
trial, Juror Lembke and prosecution witness Hailes shared an 
ashtray, apparently while each smoked at least one cigarette (R. 
165, 168-9). They discussed whether lights were working (R. 164) 
and then moved on to topics of a more personal nature. Witness 
Hailes informed the juror that he hoped the trial would not take 
long since he was "going to Eureka, just driving down there, where I 
lived". (R. 164). He also asked the juror whether she had served 
on a jury before (R. 167). This type of conversation breeds the 
same sense of familiarity as the toe conversation in Pike and the 
conversation regarding families and jobs in Erickson, and could 
serve to align the juror with the State. 
The conversation in this case went further than the 
conversation in Pike or Erickson since Lembke's role as a juror and 
her response to a voir dire question were discussed. Although Juror 
Lembke initially told the Court that she and Mr. Hailes had not 
discussed the case during their conversation (R. 164), as 
questioning continued, she acknowledged that a portion of the 
conversation also dealt with question asked of the panel on voir 
dire (R. 166). Witness Hailes indicated that he believed a police 
officer's testimony should be given greater weight than that of a 
lay witness and that he was surprised none of the jurors felt that 
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way (R. 166-7). Such a discussion as to the general veracity of 
police officers was a clear message that their testimony should be 
given greater weight. Given the nature of the topics^ discussed, 
the encounter between Hailes and the juror was more than brief or 
incidental, giving rise to a rebuttal presumption of prejudice. 
The State failed to rebut the presumption that Juror 
Lembke was influenced by the conversation in this case. As this 
Court pointed out in Pike, two rationales for the rebuttable 
presumption exist: (1) a juror may not recognize the influence of a 
conversation and it may be extremely difficult for a defendant to 
prove such influence and (2) the judicial process suffers from the 
appearance of impropriety resulting from a juror's conversation with 
a witness. 
In the present case, Hailes and the police officers were 
important witnesses. In order to convict Mr. Larocco, the jurors 
would have to believe Hailes1 testimony that he had totalled his 
Mustang in 1975, thereby establishing the availability of the VIN 
from that car and the illicit use of such VIN by Mr. Larocco. 
The testimony of the officers was also critical in 
establishing the elements of the crimes charged. To convict 
4 Juror Lembke did not recall remarks regarding police veracity 
until several pages into questioning. Initially, she informed the 
Court that the substance of the conversation involved only Hailes 
desire for quick resolution. This suggests that jurors not only 
have difficulty recognizing whether they have been influenced by a 
conversation but also in remembering and relaying details of the 
conversation. It also raises a question as to whether all details 
of the conversation in the instant case were raised. 
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Mr. Larocco the jurors had to believe that the officers found two 
different VINs, one of which was glued, rather than riveted, onto 
the dashboard, and that the officer's conducted the investigation 
fairly and efficiently. 
In this case, both rationales for the rebuttable 
presumption set forth in Pike are applicable. Juror Lembke may well 
have been affected by the conversation in regard to her perception 
of Hailes' credibility as well as that of the police officers but 
unable to recognize such influence. Although she claimed that the 
conversation would not affect her deliberations, such a claim is not 
sufficient to rebut the presumption under Pike or Erickson. In 
addition, the appearance of impropriety in this case raises a 
question as to whether Mr. Larocco received a fair trial. 
Another juror stood nearby and apparently heard at least 
a portion of the conversation (R. 167). Although the other juror 
did not participate, overhearing the conversation amounts to more 
than a brief incidental contact. The trial judge failed to question 
the other juror; having overheard a portion of the conversation, the 
other juror could also have been influenced by the conversation. 
The trial court's failure to question her and the State's failure to 
otherwise rebut the presumption raises a question as to whether 
Mr. Larocco received a fair trial. 
In this case, where more than a brief or incidental 
contact occurred between a prosecution witness and at least one 
juror, and the state failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice 
raised by such contact, the conviction should be reversed and the 
case remanded for a new trial. 
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POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR, LAROCCOfS 
MOTION FOR MISTRIAL AFTER TWO JURORS APPARENTLY 
SAW HIM SHACKLED AND IN POLICE CUSTODY. 
During the noon recess prior to the beginning of their 
deliberations, two jurors saw Mr. Larocco in police custody. 
Defense counsel raised the issue with the trial court immediately 
after the jury delivered its verdict (R. 327) and the trial judge 
thereafter questioned the jurors as to what they had seen 
(R. 327-9). (For transcript of entire questioning of jurors, See 
Exhibit "C"). 
One of the jurors saw Mr. Larocco being escorted 
downstairs by a man in a suit (R. 328). Although the Court did not 
ask the juror whether Mr. Larocco was handcuffed, that apparently 
was the case (R. 328). The other juror saw Mr. Larocco approaching 
a police car; again, he was apparently handcuffed although the court 
did not specifically question the juror regarding that detail 
(R. 328-9). Both jurors told the court that witnessing Mr. Larocco 
in custody had no influence on their deliberations (R. 329). 
Trying a defendant Ln identifiable prison clothing before 
a jury violates the United States Constitution's Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial and the Fourteenth 
Amendment guarantee to equal protection of the laws. See Estelle v. 
Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976); see also Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341 
(Utah 1980). In Estelle v. Williams, the United States Supreme 
Court pointed out that: 
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The actual impact of a particular practice on the 
judgment of jurors cannot always be fully 
determined. But this Court has left no doubt that 
the probability of deleterious effects on 
fundamental rights calls for close judicial scrutiny. 
Id. at 504-5 (citations omitted). The Estelle Court also expressed 
concern that persons in custody during trial were generally those 
who cannot post bail. Hence, persons who are in prison garb (or 
otherwise in custody) are not given equal protection of the laws. 
Id. at 505. 
In Chess v. Smith, this Court acknowledged that the 
prejudice of "appearing before a jury in identifiable prison clothes 
is not measurable, and it is so potentially prejudicial as to create 
a substantial risk of fundamental unfairness in a criminal trial." 
Chess, 617 P.2d at 344. This Court held that "[i]n a matter of such 
fundamental importance to the basic fairness of a trial . . . a 
trial judge should on his own initiative inquire of a defendant 
whether he wishes to waive his right not to appear in prison clothes 
so that the record affirmatively shows an intelligent and conscious 
waiver. . . ." Id. at 345. 
The California Supreme Court has consistently held that 
the use of shackles or restraining devices on a defendant or defense 
witness at trial is prejudicial and should not be permitted except 
in extreme situations where a special need is demonstrated. In 
People v. Duran, 127 Cal. Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322 (Ca. 1976), the 
California Supreme Court reasoned that jurors who see a defendant in 
shackles are likely to believe that the defendant is violent and 
therefore the use of such restraints should be limited to situations 
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where "there is a showing of manifest need for such restraints." 
Du_ran, 545 P.2d at 1327. 
In the present casef two jurors saw the defendant 
shackled and in custody after the trial had adjourned for the lunch 
recess preceding the juryfs deliberations (R. 327). The fact that 
the observations were made during an adjournment rather than during 
trial proceedings does not distinguish this case from the previously 
cited cases. Although the State may have had a legitimate security 
interest in having the defendant shackled and in custody as he was 
leaving his trial, the trial court erred in allowing jurors to view 
Mr. Larocco so restrained.5 The momentary viewing of Mr. Larocco in 
custody established him as an incarcerated detainee in the minds of 
the jurors. The prejudice flowing from such momentary viewing is 
precisely the same as the situation in which the defendant is 
brought into court with prison garb or shackles on. The two jurors' 
perceptions of Mr. Larocco's were thereafter tainted by their 
knowledge that Mr. Larocco's was being restrained and incarcerated 
at the time of trial. Mr. Larocco had a right to be brought before 
the jurors, "with the appearance, dignity, and self-respect of a 
free and innocent man, . . . " Duran, 545 P.2d at 1327. 
A defendant who is able to post bail is able to present 
the "appearance, dignity, and self-respect of a free and innocent 
man." Because such a defendant has money, he goes through trial 
5
 The trial judge acknowledged, "I suppose what I am saying is the 
bailiff should have made sure that situation didn't occur." 
(R. 328.) 
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unincarcerated and unfettered by shackles. But the defendant who 
cannot afford bail is subjected to shackles as well as police 
custody. For this reason, as the Supreme Court noted in Estelle v. 
Williams, juror identification of the defendant as an inmate may 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of 
the law as well as the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a fair trial. 
The jurors' statements that they were not influenced by 
viewing Mr. Larocco in custody fail to establish that the 
information did not impact on their deliberations. As this Court 
has acknowledged in the context of contact between jurors and 
witnesses, a juror may not be able to recognize the impact of 
inadmissible information. See discussion supra at 24; see also 
State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985). For all of the foregoing 
reasons, Mr. Larocco's convictions should be reversed, and the case 
remanded for a new trial. 
POINT IV. 
POSSESSION OF A STOLEN VEHICLE IS A LESSER INCLUDED 
OFFENSE OF THEFT OF THAT SAME VEHICLE. 
Mr. Larocco raises two related assignments of error: 
(1) pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402(3) (1953 as amended), he 
cannot be convicted of both possession of a stolen vehicle and theft 
of that same vehicle since the theft encompasses the possession 
offense, and (2) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct that 
possession of a stolen vehicle is a lesser included offense of theft 
of that same vehicle. 
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Prior to trial/ Mr. Larocco submitted a proposed jury 
instruction which would have instructed jurors that possession of a 
stolen vehicle is a lesser included offense of theft of an operable 
vehicle (R. 94) (Addendum D). The trial court refused to give the 
instruction and instead instructed the jury that it could return 
convictions for both offenses (R. 78) (Addendum E). Defense counsel 
objected to the court's instruction and the Court's refusal to give 
the proposed lesser included offense instruction (R. 324). 
A. MR. LAROCCO CANNOT BE CONVICTED OF BOTH 
THEFT OF A MOTOR VEHICLE AND POSSESSION OF 
THAT SAME VEHICLE. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402(3) (1953 as amended) provides in 
pertinent part: 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense 
included in the offense charged but may not be 
convicted of both the offense charged and the 
included offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or 
less than all the facts required to establish the 
commission of the offense charged; 
In State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983), this Court 
held that theft was a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery 
under the circumstances of that case. This court pointed out that a 
principal and secondary test must be applied in determining whether 
a greater-lesser relationship exists between two crimes. The 
principal test requires a comparison of the statutory elements of 
each crime since an offense is a lesser included where "[i]t is 
established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required 
to establish the commission of the offense charged. . . . " Utah 
Code Ann. §76-1-402(3)(a) (1953 as amended). 
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Because some crimes have multiple variations, the 
"greater-lesser relationship exists between some variations of these 
crimes, but not between others." Hill, 674 P.2d at 97. As a 
result, the secondary test is also required. Pursuant to that test: 
"[i]n order to determine whether a defendant can be 
convicted and punished for two different crimes 
committed in connection with a single criminal 
episode, the court must consider the evidence to 
determine whether the greater-lesser relationship 
exists between the specific variations of the 
crimes. . . . " 
Id. In Hill, the evidence showed that the only property taken was 
taken from the manager as part of the robbery and therefore, theft 
was a lesser included offense under both tests. 
In State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874 (Utah 1985) (as Amended 
on Rehearing), this court applied Hill and concluded that under the 
circumstances of that case, aggravated assault was a lesser included 
offense of the aggravated burglary. Where a defendant is 
inappropriately convicted of both a lesser included offense and a 
greater offense, this Court has held that the appropriate remedy is 
to reverse the lesser conviction and vacate the sentence. Id. at 
878-9. 
In State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1987), this Court 
concluded that aggravated assault was not a lesser included offense 
of aggravated robbery under the circumstances of that case since 
different evidence was required to establish the two crimes and 
different victims were involved in the two crimes. Theft, however, 
was a lesser included offense of the robbery under the circumstances 
in Branch and this court reversed the theft conviction and vacated 
the sentence. 
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In Shackleford v. State, 481 P.2d 163 (Okl. 1971) the 
court held that possession of narcotics taken in a robbery of a 
pharmacy was a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery. 
Numerous courts examining the issue of couble convictions have held 
similarly to the Shackleford court that a defendant cannot be 
convicted of theft (or robbery or larceny) and possession (or 
receiving or retaining) the same stolen property. See e.g., 
Sundberg v. State, 636 P.2d 619 (Alaska App. 1981); Pierce v. State, 
627 P.2d 211 (Alaska App. 1981); People v, Jackson, 627 P.2d 741 
(Colo. 1981); State v. Alvarez, 678 P.2d 1132 (Kan. App. 1984); 
State v, Hernandez, 689 P.2d 1261 (Mont. 1984); State v. Smith, 
679 P.2d 963 (N.M. App. 1983); State v. Richards, 621 P.2d 165 
(Wash. App. 1980); People v. Jaramillo, 548 P.2d 706 (Cal. 1976); 
State v. Mcpherson, 444 P.2d 5 (Or. 1968). 
In the present case, Mr. Larocco was convicted of theft 
of an operable motor vehicle, a second degree felony, and of 
possession of a stolen vehicle, a third degree felony. Both 
convictions related to the same vehicle, a 1973 Ford Mustang. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as amended), lists the 
elements of theft, the greater offense in this case:6 
Theft — Elements. — A person commits theft if he 
obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the 
property of another with a purpose to deprive him 
thereof. 
6 in Milanovich v. United States, 365 U.S. 551, 81 S.Ct. 728, 
5 L.Ed. 773 (1961), the United States Supreme Court pointed out 
that the determination as to whether receiving stolen property 
is a lesser included offense of theft of that property is a 
question of statutory construction, and held that in that case, 
receiving stolen property was a lesser included offense of 
theft of the same property. 
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Because the theft was of an operable motor vehicle, the offense is a 
second degree felony. U.C.A. §76-6-412(1)(a)(ii) (1953 as 
amended). Utah Code Ann. §41-1-112 proscribes possession of a 
stolen vehicle: 
Receiving or transferring stolen vehicle a 
felony. Any person who . . . 
has in his possession any vehicle which he knows or 
has reason to believe has been stolen or unlawfully 
taken, and who is not an officer of the law engaged 
at the time in the performance of his duty as such 
officer, is guilty of a felony. 
By definition, theft contains two elements: 1) 
obtaining or exercising unauthorized control over the property of 
another, 2) with a purpose to deprive him thereof. Possessing a 
stolen vehicle also contains two elements: 1) possessing a 
vehicle, and 2) the possessor knowing or having reason to believe it 
was stolen. Both of the elements of possession of a stolen vehicle 
are necessarily included in the first element of theft. Hence, the 
first prong of the Hill test is met. 
The second prong of the Hill test requires a 
determination as to whether "the greater-lesser relationship exists 
between the specific variations of the crimes. . . . " State v. 
Hill, 674 P.2d at 97. In the instant case, the theft of the vehicle 
occurred four years prior to the arrest of Mr. Larocco. There is no 
evidence that during the four year gap, there were other persons who 
possessed the vehicle or intervening circumstances in regard to the 
possession of the vehicle. Under such circumstances, the second 
prong of the Hill test is met. Possession of the stolen vehicle is 
therefore a lesser included offense of theft of that same vehicle. 
- 35 -
Mr. Larocco's conviction for both offenses violates the fifth 
amendment prohibition against double jeopardy and/or the prohibition 
against double conviction contained in Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402(3) 
(1953 as amended) . 
Phillip Larocco respectfully requests this Court to 
reverse the lesser conviction (possession of a stolen vehicle) and 
vacate its sentence. Additionally/ Mr. Larocco was entitled to an 
instruction on possession of a stolen vehicle as a lesser offense of 
the theft count (see Subpoint B, below), and the trial court's 
refusal to so instruct the jury constituted reversible error, 
mandating a remand of the theft conviction for retrial. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT 
THE JURY THAT POSSESSION OF A STOLEN VEHICLE IS 
A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF THEFT OF THAT 
SAME VEHICLE. 
In State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), this Court 
clarified that where a defendant requests an instruction regarding a 
lesser included offense, the test to be applied is the broader 
evidence-based standard. Pursuant to this evidenced based standard, 
two requirements must be met: 
First, the statutory elements of the offenses must 
be related in some way; there must be some overlap 
in the definitions of the two crimes, even though 
they need not meet the totally "included" standard. 
Second, . . . the court must instruct on the lesser 
offense only if there is some evidence at trial 
that, if believed by the jury, would provide a 
"rational basis for a verdict of acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him 
of the included offense." 
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State v. Brown, 694 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah 1984) quoting Utah Code Ann. 
§76-1-402(4) (1953 as amended). 
In emphasizing the importance of instructions on lesser 
included offenses, this Court quoted the United States Supreme Court: 
[I]t has long been recognized that "the lesser 
included offense' can also be beneficial to the 
defendant because it affords the jury a less drastic 
alternative than the choice between conviction of 
the offense charged and acquittal. 
State v. Baker, 671 P.2d at 167 quoting Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 
625, 633 (1980). 
The first step of the evidence-based analysis requires a 
comparison of the elements of the two offenses to determine whether 
there is an overlap between the elements of the two crimes. In the 
instant case, the possession of a stolen vehicle necessarily 
involves the exercise of unauthorized control over the property of 
another (See subpoint A, above) and therefore is a lesser included 
offense of theft of that same vehicle. 
The second step in the evidence-based analysis requires 
consideration of whether some evidence was presented at trial which, 
if believed by the jury, would provide a rational basis for 
acquitting the defendant of the greater offense and convicting on 
the lesser included offense. In order to establish the theft 
charge, the greater offense, the state was required to establish 
that Mr. Larocco took the vehicle. To establish the theft, the 
State relied on the identification testimony of David Luce, the 
salesman. Although Mr. Luce identified Mr. Larocco as the person 
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who test drove the car and never returned it, his description of the 
thief did not match Mr. Larocco's physical appearance. 
Mr. Luce described the person who took the car as 5'8" -
5'10" in height and weighing 160-165 pounds (R. 202), which was 
approximately Mr. Luce's size. However, at trial, defense counsel 
pointed out to the jury the obvious fact that Mr. Larocco is a tall, 
heavy set man (R. 310). Although the record does not make clear 
exactly how tall he is nor how much Mr. Larocco weighed, his sister, 
Paula Bone, testified that the defendant wore a size extra-extra-
large shirt and that it was very difficult to find pants large 
enough for him (R. 291). Furthermore, both Ms. Bone and Darrel 
Norman, Mr. Larocco's brother-in-law, testified that Mr. Larocco was 
at least as heavy in 1981 (at the time the car was stolen), as he 
was at trial (R. 290, 295). 
The weak identification weighed against the theft charge, 
but had no bearing on the possession of a stolen motor vehicle 
charge. Mr. Luce's testimony was the only evidence that Mr. Larocco 
stole the vehicle. Therefore, the inaccurate identification of 
Mr. Larocco provided a rational basis for acquitting him of theft 
but still convicting him of possession of a stolen vehicle. 
Mr. Larocco does not bear the burden of showing that such an outcome 
was likely; he need only demonstrate a rational basis for such 
action, in keeping with this Court's recognition that lesser 
included offense instructions should be liberally available to 
defendants where a possibility exists that the jury might choose to 
conviction a lesser offense. The evidence in this case presented 
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such a possibility, and the trial court committed reversible error 
in failing to give the requested instruction. 
CONCLUSION 
Phillip Larocco, Appellant, respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse his convictions and remand his case to the trial 
court for either dismissal of the charges or a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, this ^1 day of June, 1988. 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOop 
Regular October Term, 1987 January 26, 198$f 
Phillip Paul Larocco, 
Plaintiff, 
v. No. 870412 
State of Utah, 
Respondent. 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari having been considered, and 
the Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is ordered 
that a Writ of Certiorari be, and the same is, granted as prayed. 
ADDENDUM B 
10 
1 other chances if you want to look at my chambers later on. 
2 But we'll be in recess on this case until 2:00 p.m. 
3 (Whereupon, court recessed 
4 at 12:15 p.m. and reconvened at 2:12 p.m. in chambers with 
5 Court and counsel present.) 
6 I THE COURT: Hi, Mrs. Lembke. Come on in. 
7 The record should show that Mrs. Lembke, one 
8 of the jurors in the case before the Court, is in chambers 
9 with the lawyer for the defendant and the prosecutor 
because there was an observed conversation between the 
11 I juror and one of the persons out in the hall who is called 
\2\SLsa witness for the prosecution. And there is a question 
13 raised about the conversation, whether you talked with this 
14 witness about the case. 
15 JUROR LEMBKE: No. 
16 THE COURT: What were you talking about, 
17 if you don't mind us finding out about it? 
18 JUROR LEMBKE: Well, first of all, he 
19 pulled the light switch in the hall and had mentioned that 
20 it worked, and then he did the other switch. And then 
21 he just was saying he hoped it didn't - - the case didn't 
22 go long, that he was going to Eureka, just driving down 
23 there, where I lived. Just general conversation. Nothing 
24 at all about the case. 
25 THE COURT: Did you know who he was? 
o L 
10 
u 
12 
JUROR LEMBKE: I thought I recognized 
his sweater. We shared an ashtray. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, I don't think 
that there's anything else about the conversation as far 
as that's concerned. Itfs a question of friendliness or 
whatever that sometimes raises a question about what you 
would think of him as a witness or if he was called or 
9 I not called, whatever. We have to be very careful about 
9 j that sort of thing. 
JUROR LEMBKE: I understand. 
THE COURT: I guess what we ought to do 
is isolate everybody from everybody in terms of that 
t3 | sort of thing. Maybe the jurors should go down to the 
14 other end of the hall, the City end, while people are 
15 out in the hall. You don't know who they are, and I don't 
16 know who they are. And that would end speculation. 
17 Do you feel comfortable about the whole thing? 
18 Otherwise - -
19 JUROR LEMBKE: Yes. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. As long as that was 
21 the substance of your conversation. 
22 JUROR LEMBKE: Yes. The case wasn't 
23 mentioned at all. 
24 MR. H0RT0N: Do you feel you can still 
25 be fair to both sides and not be influenced by the 
22 
conversation out in the hall? 
JUROR LEMBKE: Yes, because we didn't 
talk about anything involving anything. I mean I don't 
know why he's here. I don't, you know, other than the 
fact he is a witness. I have no idea. 
MR. HORTON: Do you feel you could 
weigh his testimony the same as any other witnesses if 
he testifies and he is subject to cross-examination and 
so forth? 
JUROR LEMBKE: Yes. 
MS. REMAL: Do you feel as though the 
fact you had this conversation makes him more believable - -
JUROR LEMBKE: No. 
MS. REMAL: - - because you already 
talked to him? 
JUROR LEMBKE: No. 
He did mention one thing. That he was 
surprised at the questions that were-asked. And that 
he was - - he was surprised, and that he, himself, would 
have said, yes, when you asked if you would believe a 
policeman more than any other person, that was the only 
comment that was made. And - - and I didn't - - when the 
judge asked if we would believe a policeman more than any 
other person, and he said he probably would have raised 
his hand. 
29 
that would be his 
THE COURT: If he had 
JUROR LEMBKE: Had he 
, you know - -
been a 
been a 
juror? 
juror, 
MS. REMAL: So you did have that bit of 
conversation concerning the jury selection? 
I made no comment 
JUROR LEMBKE: Yeah. 
• 
MS. REMAL: Was there 
He did say that. 
any other discussion 
about the questions asked on jury selection or 
like that? 
I had ever served 
anything 
JUROR LEMBKE: No. And he asked me if 
on a jury before, and 
THE COURT: Any other 
all of this was going on? 
next to me there. 
she left, and he 
(Indicating.) 
walking by. The 
before - -
I said, 
jurors 
"No.11 
there while 
JUROR LEMBKE: One. The girl sitting 
As he was walking up 
used the ashtray. 
THE COURT: The young 
to use the ashtray, 
lady on your left? 
JUROR LEMBKE: On my right. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
JUROR LEMBKE: Or she 
The blonde. 
left just as he was 
one right there. We were out 
THE COURT: Okay. 
there 
1 MR. HORTON: The comment that he made to 
2 you about the police officer, would that affect your 
3 deliberation in any way? 
4 JUROR LEMBKE: No. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. You can 
6 sit back in the jury box. 
7 (Whereupon, Juror Lembke 
8 I left the chambers.) 
g Miss Remal, you can make your motion. 
10 MS. REMAL: Your Honor, I would move 
11 for a mistrial. I'm sure that Mrs. Lembke didn't mean 
12 anything by her conversation with the witness, but I'm 
13 still concerned that there was a little bit of conversation 
14 pertaining to the case, at least to the jury selection, 
15 that went on, and the comment about him saying that he 
16 would have answered the question differently than she 
17 apparently did. I'm just a little concerned there may be 
18 some influence depending on that. Arid as I said before, 
19 the fact that she had this conversation with him, I'm 
20 afraid that even though not consciously she may just find 
21 him more believable because she may think he's a nice guy, 
22
 having had this conversation. And I'pi a little bit 
23 concerned about that. 
24 THE COURT: Mr. Horton? 
25 MR. HORTON: From the limited conversation 
1 they had and the fact she's been in here and questioned 
2 i about it, my impression would be if anything she would 
31 try to compensate in favor of the defense. And I don't 
4 I think there's a basis for a mistrial, so we would oppose 
s the motion at this time. j 
6| THE COURT: My perception of the I 
7 converstation's content and the response of the juror to 
8 the questions about the conversation leads the Court to | 
9 I believe there's no basis for a mistrial. 
Motion is denied, 
MS . REMAL: Well - -
THE COURT: I guess we can do - - j 
MS. REMAL:• Do it? | 
14I THE COURT: I guess we can go do it. 
15 Wait. Wait. Wait. 
16 MS. REMAL: Your Honor, I would like to 
17 renew my Motion to Supress the evidence that was taken as 
18 a result of the search of the car on the day of Mr. Larocco rs 
19 arrest and just make it clear to the court there's a 
20 continuing objection to the evidence obtained as a result 
21 of that search, so I don't; have to jump up and down through 
22 the trial. 
23 THE COURT: Motion is denied, and the 
24 ruling of the Court you already have. 
25 MS. REMAL: Thank you. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
ADDENDUM C 
1
 decided by this jury. 
2 I appreciate your being here for the purpose 
3 of this experience and on behalf of the citizens of the 
4
 community, we wish to thank you for your participation. 
5 You've done a good job listening to the evidence it 
6 appeared to me. I don't know anything about your job in 
7 the deliberation room or make no comment on how you make 
8 a determination on the verdict, but I think you were 
9 attentive, and that's what counts. You have proven again 
10 the system at least can be employed to make a determination 
n to find the truth. And I appreciate your participation. 
12 The jury is excused. Thank you very much. 
13 MS. REMAL: Excuse me, Your Honor. 
14 Before you excuse the jury, may Mr. Horton and I approach 
15 the bench? 
16 THE COURT: Yes. 
17 (Whereupon, there was a 
18 discussion off the record between Court and counsel at the 
19 bench, out of the hearing of the jury.) 
20 Counsel have raised an issue, and I need to 
21 explore it with you, ladies and gentlemen. 
22 The defendant indicates that during the time 
23 of the noon recess when you were leaving to go to lunch, 
24 while the bailiff had you in custody, he took you down to 
25 a place where the defendant was entering a police car, 
1 showing that he was in custody. And I wondered whether any 
2 of you saw that. I suppose what I'm saying is the bailiff 
3 should have made sure that situation didn't occur. That's 
4 what the complaint is. 
5 Any of you see the defendant getting into a 
6 police car? 
7 JUROR BRAGG: I saw him, but I didn't 
8 see him go get into a police car. I saw him go downstairs, 
9 but he was with a guy with a suit on. 
to THE COUPvT: Just walking down the stairs? 
11 JUROR BRAGG: Yeah. 
12 JUROR BROADHEAD: I saw him when he 
13 was approaching the car. I probably wouldn't have seen 
14 him, but we were sitting in the back of a station wagon 
15 facing that way. 
16 THE COURT: You were sitting in the back 
17 of the station wagon? 
18 JUROR BROADHEAD: Uh-huh. 
19 THE COURT: Whose station wagon is that? 
20 THE BAILIFF: This lady here. (Indicating. 
21 THE COURT: Oh. You rode over to the 
22 China Village? 
23 THE BAILIFF: Yeah. They didn't want 
24 to freeze their toes. 
25 JUROR BROADHEAD: That's the only way I 
1 
2 
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4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
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11 
12 
13 
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22 
23 
24 
25 
saw him. 
THE COURT: Did that have any influence 
on your determination in this cas$? 
You're shaking your head, Miss Bragg. It didn't 
have any effect - -
JUROR BRAGG: No. 
THE COURT: - - on your decision in the 
case, influence your deliberations? 
JUROR BRAGG: No. 
THE COURT: Miss Broadhead, how about 
you? 
JUROR BROADHEAD: No. 
THE COURT: Anyone else see him get into 
a police car? 
All right. You're excused. Thank you. 
(Whereupon, the jury was 
excused at 3:54 p.m.) 
THE COURT: What do you want to do about 
sentencing? 
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, Mr. Larocco has 
indicated that he would prefer to be sentenced at a later 
date. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. REMAL: We ask that a pre-sentence 
report be prepared. 
ADDENDUM D 
INSTRUCTION JNU. 
If the State has failed to convince you beyond a 
reasonable doubt of the existence of all of the elements of 
the offense of Auto Theft, you may consider whether the 
Defendant is guilty of the lesser included offense of 
Possession of a Stolen Vehicle. Before you can find PHILLIP 
LAROCCO guilty of the crime of Possession of a Stolen Vehicle, 
the State must prove each of the following elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt: 
1. That on or about the 6th day of June, 1985, ir* 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, PHILLIP PAUL LAROCCO had in 
his possession a motor vehicle that: had been stolen or unlawfully 
taken, 
2. That PHILLIP PAUL LAROCCO knew or had reason to 
believe the vehicle had been stolen or unlawfully taken. 
3. That the Defendant v/as not an officer of the lav; 
engaged at that time in the performance of his duty as such an 
officer. 
If you believe that the evidence established each and 
all of these essential elements of the offense beyond a resonable 
doubt, it is you duty to convict the Defendant. On the other 
hand, if the evidence has failed to establish one or more of 
said elements, then you should find the Defendant Not Cuilty. 
ADDENDUM E 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
When you retire to consider your verdicts, you will select 
one of your members to act as foreperson who will preside over your 
deliberations. 
Your verdicts in this case must be either: 
Guilty of THEFT as charged in Count I of the Information; 
or 
Not Guilty of Count I, THEFT; 
And/Or 
Guilty of POSSESSION OF A STOLEN VEHICLE as charged in 
Count II of the Information; or 
Net Guilty of Count II, P03ESSI0N OF A STOLEN VEHICLE; 
as your deliberations may determine. 
This being a criminal case, a unanimous concrrence of 
all jurors is required to find a verdict. Your verdicts must be 
in v/riting and when found, must be signed and dated by your fore-
person and then returned by you to this court. When your verdicts 
have been found, notify the bailiff that you are ready to repor. 
to the Court. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah 
JUDGE y% . -$f 
H. DiXON hiroDLEY 
f-s^ CLERK , 
By^4(, ) t M MJ.'l'l 1^ 
ij Denuty Clerk 
